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A New Model of Wage Determination and Wage Inequality
*
 
This paper proposes a new model of wage determination and wage inequality. In this model, 
wage-setters set workers’ wages; they do so either directly, as when individuals vote in a 
salary committee, or indirectly, as when political parties, via the myriad of social, economic, 
fiscal, and other policies, generate wages. The recommendations made by wage-setters (or 
arising from their policies) form a distribution, and all the wage-setter-specific distributions are 
combined into a single final wage distribution. There may be any number of wage-setters; 
some wage-setters count more than others; and the wage-setters may differ among 
themselves on both the wage distribution and the amounts recommended for particular 
workers. We use probability theory to derive initial results, including both distribution-
independent and distribution-specific results. Fortuitously, elements of the model correspond 
to basic democratic principles. Thus, the model yields implications for the effects of 
democracy on wage inequality. These include: (1) The effects of the number of wage-setters 
and their power depend on the configuration of agreements and disagreements; (2) 
Independence of mind reduces wage inequality, and dissent does so even more; (3) When 
leaders of democratic nations seek to forge an economic consensus, they are unwittingly 
inducing greater economic inequality; (4) Arguments for independent thinking will be more 
vigorous in small societies than in large societies; (5) Given a fixed distributional form for 
wages and two political parties which either ignore or oppose each other’s distributional 
ideas, the closer the party split to 50-50, the lower the wage inequality; and (6) Under certain 
conditions the wage distribution within wage-setting context will be normal, but the normality 
will be obscured, as cross-context mixtures will display a wide variety of shapes. 
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when the largest income exceeds five times the smallest income, Aristotle’s (Politics, Book II)
observation that inheritance laws and laws on procreation generate economic inequality, John
Chrysostom’s (Homily 66.3, “On the Gospel of Matthew”) effort to estimate the proportions poor
and rich in the city of Antioch, Gregory the Great’s (Moralia in Job, xxi) insight, “Where there is
no sin, there is no inequality,”and Aquinas’ (Summa Theologica II-I, Q. 105, art. 2) spirited
defense of the injunction in Leviticus 19 to pay workers promptly have helped shape social
thought and social science.  Moreover, there is a strong sense that inequality is a bad which needs
to be “corrected”, as noted by Aristotle (Politics, Book II, Chapter 9).  Leviticus 25 provides a
way to correct the bad, establishing a jubilee year every fiftieth year -- when inequalities are
erased and the ancestral allotments are restored -- and Jesus imagines a more radical upheaval
where inequality is preserved but “the last will be first, and the first last” (Matthew 19:30).
1
1.  INTRODUCTION
This paper proposes a new model of wage determination and wage inequality.  Wages
and the wage distribution touch virtually every aspect of human experience, and are linked to
fundamental features of individual and society, from health and happiness to status and the sense
of justice to crime and revolution.  The search for knowledge about wage processes and social
and economic inequality has produced several rich literatures, including classic philosophical
inquiries (e.g., Plato, Laws, Book V; Aristotle, Politics, Book II; Aquinas (Summa Theologica II-
I, Q. 105, art. 2); Rousseau 1755 [1952]); religious narratives (e.g., Leviticus 19, 25; Matthew
19, 20), sermons (e.g., St. John Chrysostom (386-407 [1860]), St. Antoninus), and scholarly
contributions in the social sciences and statistics (e.g., Jencks et al. 1972; Champernowne and
Cowell 1998; Kleiber and Kotz 2003).
1
The new wage model began as an attempt to provide an account of the wage process that
for at least some contexts would be more true to life than extant models.  In the world of the
model, wage-setters set workers’ wages; they do so either directly, as when individuals vote in a
salary committee, or indirectly, as when political parties, via the myriad of social, economic,
fiscal, and other policies, generate wages.  The recommendations made by wage-setters (or
arising from their policies) form a distribution, and all the wage-setter-specific distributions are
combined into a single final wage distribution.  The model has three key features:  (1) the number
of wage-setters may vary; (2) some wage-setters may count more than others; and (3) wage-
setters may disagree with each other on both the wage distribution and the amounts  The democratic principles, too, have a rich history, better known under the rubric of
2
forms of government (going back at least as far as Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Politics).  For
example, Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologica, II-I, Q. 105, art. 1), commenting on law and
invoking Aristotle (Politics, Book II), notes: “[A]ll should take some share in the government, for
this form of constitution ensures peace among the people, commends itself to all, and is guarded
by all.”
  For example, discussion of the benevolent dictator goes back to Plato.  Augustine 
3
(City of God, Book V, Ch 24) echoes Plato, and thus begins a great tradition of ruler-saints – like
Louis IX and the Empress Pulcheria.  [In the complex interplay of sociobehavioral mechanisms,
it is not without interest that poor saints outnumber rich saints and scholar-saints outnumber
ruler-saints.]  Similarly, duarchy, or rule by two (also called biarchy, diarchy, dyarchy, and
duumvirate), goes back to antiquity.  Duarchy was for the most part unsuccessful, perhaps due to
the “envy of equals” (Lewis 1852:II,79-80; see also Plutarch’s (c. 46-120 [1952]) Pyrrhus and
Lysander and Gibbon (1776 [1952], Vol I, Ch 6), cited by Lewis).  A notable exception involves
Pulcheria, who, besides reigning alone, also did a stint of duarchy.  Finally, the idea of a mixed
government – combining elements of monarchy, oligarchy, democracy – has found appeal
throughout the ages (see, for example, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-I, Q. 105, art. 1).
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recommended for particular workers.  The model has a simple mathematical structure, and
analysis of the model yields interesting and novel implications for the effects of the three features
-- the number of wage-setters, their power, and their agreements and disagreements – on wage
inequality and the shape of the wage distribution.  The paper reports both distribution-
independent results and results based on classical probability distributions.
As work with the model progressed, it quickly became apparent that the three features of
the model coincide with three basic democratic principles:  (1) that as many people as possible
should share in government; (2) that they should count equally; and (3) that people are free to
hold whatever views they want.  Thus, the simple wage model turns out to yield implications for
the effects of democracy – indeed, of the form of government – on wage inequality.
2
Along the way we encounter classic themes that have fired the imagination across human
history – the benevolent dictator, the sinless world, the promise and peril of political parties, the
contributions and cost of consensus, the value of dissent, the special beneficent possibility of
duarchy, and the equally beneficent possibility of mixed government.
3
Closer to the daily life of social science, the new wage model revisits the classic question
of the shape of the income distribution – whose roots go at least as far back as Chrysostom (386-
407 [1860]) and which has captivated a diversity of commentators (Lebergott 1959).   To illustrate, the new wage model expands economic tools and concomitantly
4
underscores a basic tenet of economic sociology – viz., that full understanding of economic
phenomena which are embedded in social contexts (such as wages) requires ideas and insights
from across the social sciences (Smelser [1963] 1976; Hicks 1963; Sørensen 1977, 1979; Ben-
Porath 1980; Granovetter 1981, 1985, 1988; Granovetter in Swedberg 1990:112; Swedberg and
Granovetter 1992, 2001; Smelser and Swedberg 1994, 2005; Dobbin 2004, 2005; Zelizer 2007).
3
Specifically, we return to the pioneering work of Ammon (1899) and Pigou (1924), who sought
 to learn the reasons why income was not normally distributed, and we derive conditions under
which the wage distribution will exhibit normality.
Is the new wage model plausible?  As elaborated below, in many real-world contexts,
wages and wage schedules are set by special committees and boards, sometimes with help from
special compensation consultants.
Moreover, empirical research on distributive justice demonstrates not only the pervasive
human impulse to form ideas about the just wage but also the profound individualism of ordinary
people who disagree with each other on all aspects of the wage distribution – bringing to life the
Hatfield principle, “Equity is in the eye of the beholder” (Walster, Berscheid, and Walster
1976:4).  If people’s wage-setting activities are informed by their ideas of justice, then it is not
unreasonable to expect recommended wages to reflect some of the diversity that permeates ideas
of justice.
The work reported in this paper builds on and contributes to several disciplines and
subdisciplines, especially sociology, economics, political science, and statistics.  For example, it
contributes to political science and economics by advancing knowledge about democracy,
political parties, and wage inequality.  Within sociology, it contributes not only to social
stratification and political sociology but also to economic sociology.  As well, the paper
contributes to the study of probability distributions, especially the exponential, Erlang, general
Erlang, and the recently-introduced mirror-exponential (Jasso and Kotz 2007), reporting some
new formulas and introducing a new subfamily called the shifted mirror-exponential.
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While the model, like all models, provides only a simplified abstraction of a complex
reality, we believe that it holds some promise for a successful social science undertaking. 4
Although this paper presents only initial results, we believe that it will be possible to obtain many
more results by further application of probability theory and also by application of other tools.
Almost all the implications reported in this paper are conditional and nuanced.  But one is
strikingly free of conditions:  dissent is universally superior to independence in reducing
inequality, and independence is superior to agreement.  The democratic principle guards the
freedom to agree or disagree.  But if reducing inequality is the goal, then independent-
mindedness trumps agreement, and opposite-mindedness trumps independent-mindedness. 
Being at loggerheads has no peer.
The paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 presents the basic model.  Section 3 sets
forth the basic mathematization and basic formulas.  Section 4 reports the model's distribution-
independent implications, and Section 5 follows with analysis of shifted subfamilies of the
exponential, Erlang, general Erlang, and mirror-exponential distributions.  A short note
concludes the paper.
2.  BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE NEW WAGE MODEL:
WORKERS AND WAGE SETTERS, RECOMMENDED WAGE DISTRIBUTIONS AND
WAGE DECISIONS, POWER AND CONSENSUS
2.1.  Workers, Wage-Setters, and the Recommended Wage
To fix ideas, we begin with a situation familiar to many readers.  Every year, during the
late spring or early summer, professors are notified of their salary for the following academic
year.  The new salary usually consists of the current salary plus a salary increase which is
intended to reflect such factors as research productivity, teaching excellence, etc., constrained by
the salary budget allocated to the department.  In preparation for the salary decision, professors
submit a written list of their publications and other contributions during the previous year (or, at
some institutions, during the previous two or three years, to offset the temporal unevenness of the
publication stream and other contributions).  The individuals who review these materials and
settle on the recommendations to be made to higher university authorities are, at some  The history of professorial salaries and merit increases is insightfully discussed in
5
Clark (2006).
  The wage matrix gives rise to (up to) three kinds of distributions.  Here we are
6
concerned with only one of these distributions, the wage-setter-specific distribution of wage
recommendations for all the workers, that is, the row-specific distributions.  The column-specific
distributions – the set of wage recommendations for a single worker – are very much of interest
in other problems, such as in the study of reputation.  Moreover, in some wage situations, every
person is both a worker and a wage-setter and makes wage recommendations for all workers, self
included.  In such case, the matrix is square and gives rise to a third kind of distribution, namely,
the distribution of wages recommended by self for self (found on the principal diagonal of the
matrix).
5
institutions, a special salary committee of the departmental faculty or the standing "executive"
committee; at other institutions, salary recommendations are made solely by the departmental
chair, and at still others, by the Dean.
5
In the situation just described, and in many other workplace settings, there are thus two
kinds of actors:  workers and the wage-setters who make recommendations for the workers’
wages.  In general, each wage-setter recommends a wage amount, denoted x, for each worker. 
Indexing wage-setters by i (i = 1,..., N) and workers by j (j = 1,..., J), the wage recommended by
the ith wage-setter for the jth worker is written  .  This is the wage-setter-specific/worker-
specific wage (Table 1, panel A).
-- Table 1 about here –
A convenient way to collect all the wage recommendations made by all the wage-setters
for all the workers is by means of a matrix.  Let each row of the matrix represent a wage-setter,
and let each column of the matrix represent a worker.  Thus, each element of the matrix is the
wage recommended by the wage-setter occupying the row for the worker occupying the column. 
Table 1 (panel B) presents the wage matrix, denoted  .
Accordingly, each row of the matrix gives rise to a wage-setter-specific distribution. 
Following the usual notational conventions, the wage-setter-specific distribution is denoted X. 
This paper focuses on the   distributions, of which the number is N, one for each wage-setter.
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In the special case of a single wage-setter (who may be called a “dictator” because he or
she alone sets the salary distribution), the wage matrix collapses to a vector, as shown in Table 16
(panel C), and there is only one X distribution.
Recapitulating, the fundamental elements of the new wage model are:
1.  the fundamental actors – worker and wage-setter
2.  the fundamental quantity – the wage
3.  the fundamental matrix – the wage matrix
4.  the fundamental distribution – the wage-setter-specific recommended wage
distribution.
The model accommodates many other special features, some of which will be developed
below, but the foregoing constitute the fundamental elements, paralleling the fundamental
elements in other topical domains (Jasso 2004). 
2.2.  Recommended Wage Distributions and Wage Decisions
2.2.1.  The Wage-Setter-Specific Recommended Wage Distribution
The wage-setter-specific recommended wage distribution embodies two kinds of
considerations, one concerning the overall form and shape of the distribution – “what should the
distribution look like” -- and the other concerning the recommendation for each worker – “who
should get what”.  These have been discussed in at least two literatures, the literature on income
distribution and the literature on distributive justice.
Chipman and Moore (1980:402) distinguished between two meanings of distribution:  (1)
the distribution of the reward amounts received by particular individuals (which may be called
the “proper-name” distribution); and (2) the “anonymous” frequency distribution of reward
amounts.  They pointed out that the English language unfortunately has a single term for both
meanings, in contrast to the French (répartition and distribution, respectively).
In the study of justice, Brickman, Folger, Goode, and Schul (1981) introduced the
distinction between principles of microjustice -- which pertain to allocations to particular
individuals -- and principles of macrojustice – which pertain to the overall form of the
distribution.  Jasso (1983) elaborated the distinction and established the mathematical relations
between principles of microjustice and principles of macrojustice.7
(1)
(2)
This paper highlights two macro and two micro features which will form the basis for
micro and macro consensus, developed below.  The two macro features, not surprisingly, are the
arithmetic mean and the dispersion.  For example, in some situations there is a budget restriction,
such that all the wage-setters’ recommended-wage distributions must have the same mean:
In other situations, however, wage-setters may recommend not only the workers’ wages but also
the salary budget (presumably not without consequence for non-salary items in the budget, such
as advertising faculty searches or lodging visiting speakers).
The two micro features highlighted are the absolute amount recommended for each
worker and the worker’s relative rank in the recommended wage distributions.
2.2.2.  Combining the Wage Recommendations into a Wage Decision
Whenever there is more than one wage-setter, the wage-setters’ recommended wage
amounts for particular workers are combined into a single final wage, denoted y, and,
concomitantly, the recommended wage distributions   are combined into a single final wage
distribution, denoted Y.  We shall, for convenience, refer to these as the wage decision, although,
of course, in many real-world contexts this decision is not binding but rather constitutes a
recommendation to a higher authority (e.g., the Provost).
Combining the individual wage-setters' recommended wage amounts for a particular
worker may be thought of as generating a weighted average.  Ignoring subscripts for the worker,
this final wage may be written:
where there are N wage-setters and the weights are nonnegative and sum to one.  Formally,
 and  .
Concomitantly, combining the individual wage-setters’ recommended wage distributions
into a single wage distribution may be thought of as generating a weighted average of the X
distributions:8
(3)
It is immediately evident that the weights represent the wage-setters’ power, as will be developed
below.
2.3.  Power and Consensus
Whenever the number of wage-setters exceeds one, two new considerations come into
play:  power and consensus.  These are basic features of the wage-determination process 
developed here, and they have far-reaching implications.
2.3.1.  Power of the Wage-Setters:  Weights and the Weight Matrix
Power refers to the weight placed on each wage-setter's recommendation when all the
recommendations are combined into the final wage distribution.  As noted above, the pooling of
recommendations may be thought of as a process by which a weighted mean is calculated. 
Suppose, for example, that the first of three wage-setters recommends a salary of $67,000 for a
particular professor, while the second and third wage-setters recommend for that same professor,
respectively, a salary of $72,000 and $77,000.  If all three wage-setters have equal power, the
salary decision will be the unweighted (i.e., equally-weighted) mean, or $72,000.  On the other
hand, if the first wage-setter is very powerful, his/her view may count for 80% of the result, with
the two other wage-setters each counting for 10%; in this case, the salary decision will be
$68,500.  Indeed, if the first wage-setter has absolute power, the salary decision will be $67,000.
A wage-setter's power is represented by the weight w associated with his/her wage
recommendation.  We attach subscripts to the weight to denote the identity of the wage-setter. 
Thus,   is the weight attached to  , the wage-recommendation distribution of the ith wage-
setter.
It may happen that the weights differ not only by wage-setter but also by worker.  For
example, in an academic department, theorists may count more heavily in the remuneration of
theorists, and ethnographers may count more heavily in the remuneration of ethnographers, etc. 
In such case, a second subscript is used to distinguish workers, exactly as with the wage.  Thus,
the wage recommended by the ith wage-setter for the jth worker is, as above,  , and the attached9
(4)
weight is  (Table 2, panel A).
– Table 2 about here –
Accordingly, the formula for the jth worker's wage is given by:
As with the wage, a convenient way to collect all the weights attached to the wage
recommendations made by all the wage-setters for all the workers is by means of a matrix.  Let
each row of the weight matrix represent a wage-setter, and let each column of the matrix
represent a worker.  Thus, each element of the matrix is the weight attached to the wage
recommendation made by the wage-setter occupying the row for the worker occupying the
column.  Table 2 (panel B) presents the weight matrix, denoted  .
The weight matrix, together with its cells and its regions, provides a wealth of
information.  Entries of zero and one reveal that a wage-setter has no power or absolute power,
respectively, with respect to the worker occupying the column.  The quantity 1/N , viz., the
weight when all wage-setters have equal say, operates as a key benchmark in distinguishing
between the relatively more or less powerful among the wage-setters.  For example, if one of the
weights in a row is one or if none go below 1/N , the wage-setter occupying that row is on the
high end of the power spectrum.  Meanwhile, the weights in a column, which must sum to one,
reveal the circle of the powerful over the worker occupying the column.
Two special cases deserve mention.  First, in the special case of a dictatorship, the weight
matrix collapses to a row vector, as shown in Table 2 (panel C), and all the entries are ones. 
Second, in the special case where weights do not differ across worker, the weight matrix
collapses to a column vector, as shown in Table 2 (panel D).  In this second case, the power
configuration is universal, covering all workers, and, depending on the content of the weights, we
may say that there is a universal dictatorship, or a universal triumvirate, or a universal
democracy.  The implications to be derived in Sections 4 and 5 are for this case of universal
weights.10
(5)
When weights do differ across worker, however, it is useful to characterize the worker-
specific power configuration.  Thus, if one wage-setter has full power in setting a particular
worker's wage, we may say that there is dictatorship specific to that worker; if three wage-setters
have equal power in setting a particular worker's wage, we may say that there is a triumvirate
specific to that worker.
The weight matrix also leads to straightforward representation of each wage-setter's
power distribution – comprising all the weights in the row occupied by a particular wage-setter --
and by parameters of that distribution, such as the mean,
and variance.  Note that wage-setters' power distributions may differ sharply in one or more
parameters.  For example, suppose that one wage-setter has full power over the wage for some
workers and zero power for others; another wage-setter has   weight in all recommended
wages except those where the first wage-setter has exclusive say.  It is possible for the average
power of the two wage-setters to be the same, but the measures of dispersion may differ.
In sum, the conception of power in this model comprises three sets of power relations. 
First, the wage-setter has power over the worker (whenever the weight   is nonzero), so that
each wage-setter has power over several workers and, concomitantly, each worker is under the
power of several wage-setters.  Second, each wage-setter is involved in a hierarchy of power
relations with the other wage-setters (if the weights are not all equal).  Third, this hierarchy of
power relations among wage-setters can be multidimensional, if the power configuration differs
across target workers.
2.3.2.  Micro and Macro Consensus:
Association Among the Recommended Wage Distributions
and Whether They Are Identical or Different
The wage-setters may agree or disagree with each other concerning the micro and macro
features – or, equivalently, the proper-name and anonymous distributions.  In particular, they may11
agree or disagree with each other concerning the four features highlighted above:  (1) the mean of
the overall distribution; (2) the dispersion in the distribution; (3) the workers’ relative ranks; and
(4) the workers’ recommended wage amounts.
At one polar extreme, two wage-setters may have exactly the same views with respect to
both micro and macro features, and their recommended wage distributions are identical. 
Alternatively, their recommended wage distributions may differ in one or several ways.  They
may differ not only in absolute wages but also in rank-ordering.  For example, two professors
may view the contributions of a peer in diametrically opposite terms, the one proposing that the
third should be the highest-paid member of the department, the second arguing that the third is
overrated and should be the lowest-paid full professor.
All the patterns of agreements and disagreements are logically possible except two:  If the
worker-specific wage amounts are the same across two or more wage-setters, then (1) the
worker-specific relative ranks must be the same, and (2) the anonymous distributions must also
be the same.
To illustrate, look at two rows of the wage matrix in Table 1.  If two rows are identical,
then both the proper-name distributions and the anonymous distributions are identical.  But
suppose that two cell entries are interchanged in one row.  Now the two proper-name
distributions are no longer identical, although the anonymous distributions remain identical.
To prepare for analysis of important special cases, we focus on two dimensions of
consensus.  The first – macro consensus – considers whether the anonymous distributions are
identical or different.  Following standard practice, henceforth we refer to the anonymous
distributions simply as “distributions”.  The second dimension – micro consensus – captures
basic aspects of the association between the proper-name distributions, namely, whether two or
more of the recommended wage distributions are independent and, if dependent, whether
positively or negatively associated.
In this initial analysis of the new wage model we work mainly with three polar types of
association:  (1) independence; (2) perfect positive association; and (3) perfect negative  An example of perfect negative association is the Biblical idea that “the last will be
7
first, and the first last”(Matthew 19:30).
12
association.  Thus, the proper-name or micro dimension of consensus can range from perfect
agreement to perfect disagreement, crossing an intermediate region of random association.
To characterize micro consensus, it is natural to begin with the statistical notions of
independence and dependence.  Following Stuart and Ord (1987:28), the term "independence" is
used to mean "complete independence", viz., in a set of N variates all the marginal distributions
of all orders are independent.  Intuitively, independence indicates mutual obliviousness.  Smith’s
wage recommendations are irrelevant to Jones’ wage recommendations, and Jones’ wage
recommendations are irrelevant to Smith.
Continuing, dependence is of two kinds, positive and negative, corresponding to
agreement and disagreement.  To characterize the two extremes we use the notions of perfect
positive association and perfect negative association.  Perfect positive association denotes the
case in which each worker has the same relative rank on all the wage-setters’ recommended wage
distributions.  Perfect negative association of two recommended wage distributions denotes the
case in which the workers’ rank ordering in one distribution is exactly the reverse of the rank
ordering in the other; thus, one ranking is the conjugate ranking of the other (Kotz, Johnson, and
Read 1982:145).
7
Note that while two independent wage-setters are oblivious of each other, two dependent
wage-setters may be very much mindful of each other, agreeing with each other in the positive-
association case and disagreeing with each other in the negative-association case.
Combining now the two dimensions of consensus, we obtain a typology of six polar
types.  A version of the typology for the case of two wage-setters is presented in Table 3.
– Table 3 about here –
To fix ideas, Table 4 illustrates the six polar types for the simple case of two wage-setters
and four workers.  The top left cell represents wage-setters who are like-minded with respect to
both micro and macro features.  In the bottom left cell, the wage-setters are like-minded with  In this simple example, all six distributions have the same mean – 10.  Thus, the wage-
8
setters who espouse different distributions nonetheless agree on the distribution’s average.
13
respect to the worker ranking but not with respect to the wage amounts or the overall
distribution.  The top middle cell represents wage-setters who are independent-minded with
respect to micro features but like-minded with respect to the anonymous distribution.  In the
bottom middle cell, the wage-setters are independent-minded about micro features and they have
different views concerning the overall distribution.  The top right cell represents wage-setters
who are exactly opposite-minded with respect to both wage amounts and relative ranks but who
are like-minded about the overall distribution.  Finally, the bottom right cell portrays wage-
setters who are exactly opposite-minded with respect to both wage amounts and relative ranks
and who have different views concerning the overall distribution.
8
– Table 4 about here –
The conditions of independence and of perfect positive association can be extended
immediately to the case of N distributions.  The condition of perfect negative association,
however, requires special treatment, and for that we introduce the idea of a faction – which will
be substantively important as well -- and the principle of organized subsets proposed by Berger,
Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch (1977:126-127).
In many situations it is possible to discern subsets of wage-recommendation variates
which are internally identical but which are independent of each other.  As a simple example,
suppose that there are two wage-setters and their wage-recommendation variates are independent
(as in the middle column of Table 4).  Now suppose that two new wage-setters are brought in,
and each joins with one of the two continuing wage-setters, agreeing exactly with him/her.  In
this case, each of the two pairs has internal perfect positive association, but the two pairs are
independent.  To characterize this type of situation, we may say that there are M independent
factions, each faction generating a recommended wage distribution, denoted  , and each
faction composed of n individuals, where  .
Of course, two factions need not be independent; they may also be perfectly negatively14
associated.  To characterize this situation, we use the principle of organized subsets introduced
by Berger et al. (1977:126-127), applying it as follows:  (i) there are N wage-setters, arranged in
two factions; (ii) within faction, all the recommended wage distributions are perfectly positively
associated; and (iii) the two factions are perfectly negatively associated with each other.
The weights associated with each faction represent the proportion of all the wage-setters
in each of the two factions (possibly reflecting as well differential wage-setter power).
2.4.  Remarks on the Basic Wage-Setter Model
In the model, wage-setters set workers’ wages, the wage-setters may differ in power, and
they may be oblivious to, or agree or disagree with, each other.  It has not been necessary to
introduce supply and demand considerations, though such considerations may at times influence
the activities of the wage-setters (especially when a worker has received an outside offer), and,
indeed, one of the interpretations of the particular probability distribution used in Section 5
below relies on supply and demand.  Nonetheless, the situation can still be understood as wage-
setters making up their minds.  As discussed in economic sociology, the model we have
sketched, although like all models a simplification, appears to adequately describe the wage
determination process in an academic department and to do so without invoking markets.  As the
economists Boyes and Happel (1989:39) note, "Academics (even economists) are not used to
thinking of allocations within their institutions in terms of a market system."
Of course, the model is applicable to many situations besides that of professors.  Some
firms employ professional wage-setters -- the compensation consultants.  There may be collective
bargaining, and a myriad of special types of bargaining, such as national bargaining, company
bargaining, and plant bargaining (Chamberlain 1951; Dunlop 1958).  A firm's board of directors
may decide compensation for the chief executive officer, as studied by O'Reilly, Main, and
Crystal (1988).  There may be governmental councils that decide the pay structure for one or
more sectors of the economy, as in the Wages Councils and Wages Boards in the United
Kingdom, or statutorily-empowered individuals who decide the pay structure for a political
jurisdiction, as the justice of the peace in English counties under Queen Elizabeth I (Sells 1939;  Compensation consultants have been much in the news recently, as focus on large
9
executive compensation packages extends to the consultants who design them (Morgenson
2008); moreover, in the economic turmoil of 2008 the American public and legislators seek a
hand in executive compensation.
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Tolles 1964; Elliott 1991).  In all these cases, it seems natural to model the basic features of the
wage-determination process in terms of N wage-setters, each generating a recommended wage
distribution, together with a process for combining the N recommended wage distributions, the
, into one final wage distribution, Y.
9
2.5.  Political Parties as Wage-Setters
Consider a society with one or more political parties.  Associated with each political party
is a set of policies, and this set of policies gives rise to a potential wage distribution for the
population (Jasso 1989:260-261).  Suppose that the final wage distribution Y is a weighted
average of the potential wage distributions generated by the parties, with the weights representing
each party’s relative power (proportion of the electorate, say, or seats in a legislative body).  This
situation may be modeled exactly as the faction situation introduced above.  In the special case of
two political parties, the party split is represented by the proportions in the two parties (in the
electorate or in the legislature), denoted p and (1-p).
* * *
Table 5 summarizes the substantive elements of the model and the corresponding
mathematical or statistical representation.  In the general case, there can be any number of wage-
setters; their weights may be equal or unequal; the recommended wage distributions may be
identical or different; and the association between them may be positive, independent, or
negative.  There is one overarching question:  What are the effects of these features on inequality
in the final wage distribution Y ?  Below we analyze some special cases and obtain initial results.
– Table 5 about here –
3.  MATHEMATICAL AND STATISTICAL BUILDING-BLOCKS
This section assembles the basic building-blocks to be used in the subsequent sections.16
3.1.  Preliminary Considerations
3.1.1.  Constraints on Conditions of Micro Consensus 
We have introduced micro consensus, and in Sections 4 and 5 will assess the effects of
micro agreement, independence, and micro disagreement on inequality in the final wage
distribution.  However, not all situations are amenable to all three types of association between
the recommended wage distributions.  Here we examine briefly some constraints.
At the outset we note that it is always possible to have perfect positive association. 
Whatever an existing recommended wage distribution, it can be replicated exactly (as in the case
of identical/perfect-positively-associated X distributions, illustrated in the top left cell of Table
4); similarly, its rank-ordering can be replicated exactly (as in the case of different/perfect-
positively-associated X distributions, illustrated in the bottom left cell of Table 4).
Consider now the case of perfect negative association (illustrated in the right column of
Table 4).  It is obvious that perfect negative association can occur only in situations with two
wage-setters, for if a third wage-setter is in perfect negative association with one of two existing
wage-setters, he or she must perforce be in perfect positive association with the other.  Thus,
perfect negative association is a condition of duarchies and duumvirates – and two-party systems. 
It is an important special case, and we will obtain results applicable both to the composite
factions introduced by Berger et al. (1977), discussed in Section 2.3, and to two-party systems.
Similarly, independence is not always possible.  To illustrate, if (1) there are two wage-
setters and (2) the X distributions are identical, then in order to satisfy independence the number
of workers must be a square (4, 9, 16, etc.) or the multiple of a square (for example, 8, 12, etc.,
when the square is 4; 18, 27, etc., when the square is 9; and so on).  By induction, it can be
further shown that, continuing with identical X distributions, if there are three wage-setters, the
number of workers must be a cube (8, 27, 64, etc.) or the multiple of a cube.  The general
formula for this class of problems is c to the N, where c is the number of distinct x values and N
is, as before, the number of wage-setters.  To illustrate with an example provided by an
anonymous referee, if the number of wage-setters is two and there are two distinct values of x,  The four inequality measures analyzed by Jasso and Kotz (2008) would be a
10
reasonable starter set:  the coefficient of variation, the Gini coefficient, Atkinson’s measure
defined as the ratio of the geometric mean to the arithmetic mean, and Theil’s MLD.
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then independence requires that the number of workers be 4, 8, 12, etc. (as in the top cell in the
middle column of Table 4).  This implies that in small groups the number of workers can be such
as to render independence impossible.
3.1.2.  Representing Inequality
A major objective is to assess the effects of the main elements of the model – the number
of wage-setters, their power, and their agreements and disagreements with respect to micro and
macro aspects of the wage distribution – on the magnitude of inequality in the final wage
distribution.  As is well-known, there are many measures of inequality, and, notwithstanding
commonalities in important subsets of socioeconomic situations (such as the set of two-
parameter probability distributions discussed in Jasso and Kotz 2008), in the general case
different inequality measures may generate different inequality-orderings of distributions.  Thus,
it would be desirable to analyze the wage model using a basic set of inequality measures.
10
Here we follow a two-pronged approach.  In Section 4, which focuses on distribution-free
results, we rely on the variance, which is not dimensionless.  Accordingly, mathematical results
based on the variance can be given an inequality interpretation only if the means are equal.  Thus,
variance-based results will apply directly to cases of identical distributions (the top rows of
Tables 3 and 4), to cases where the distributions are different but have equal means (a subset of
the bottom rows of Tables 3 and 4), and to contrasts within a given set of distributions.  In
Section 5, which focuses on modeling distributions, we rely on the Gini coefficient.
3.2.  Basic Formulas
Table 6 reports basic formulas for the case of two wage-setters.  The table follows the
general format of Tables 3 and 4, showing the six main cases generated by the three types of
micro consensus and the two types of macro consensus.  In addition, Table 6 distinguishes,
within each of the six main cells, between the case in which the two wage-setters have equal  Here, and in the rest of the paper, the weights are universal; that is, each wage-setter
11
has the same weight for all workers (as in Table 2, panel D, and discussed in Section 2.3.1).
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weights and the case of unequal weights.  The general formula appears in panel A, and the
special-case formulas in panel B.
11
– Table 6 about here –
As shown, the general formula for Var(Y) is a special weighted sum of the two X
variances and the covariance between the two X distributions.  The formulas for the special cases
in panel B are derived from the general formula in panel A.  The formulas for the cases in which
the two X distributions are independent (in the middle column) are well-known; the others are
either in the literature or easily derived.
Table 7 reports the corresponding formulas for the more general case of N wage-setters. 
As in Table 6, the general formula appears in panel A and the special-case formulas in panel B. 
Note that the righthand column of Table 7 (panel B) pertains to negative association rather than
to perfect negative association, given that, as discussed above, perfect negative association
occurs in the case of two wage-setters.  Moreover, the interpretation of negative association is
that the sum of the weighted covariances is negative – that is, negative weighted covariances
dominate positive weighted covariances.  Again, as with Table 6, the formulas are either well-
known or are easily derived.
– Table 7 about here –
Most of the theorems to be presented in Section 4 will require for their proof the formulas
in Tables 6 and 7.
3.3.  The Effects of Introducing One New Wage-Setter
Besides relying on Tables 6 and 7 to assess the effects of the number of wage-setters and
other features on wage inequality, it is illuminating to consider little illustrations.  In this section
we examine the case where one new wage-setter is introduced into a group of wage-setters. 
Returning to the example of the faculty salary committee, suppose that there are three
independent wage-setters, and the committee is enlarged to four members.  The incoming wage-19
setter may develop an independent recommended wage distribution or, alternatively, may
become a partisan of one of the three original wage-setters.  Suppose that the rules are that each
wage-setter has an equal vote.  How do the two alternatives differ in their effect on wage
inequality?  To answer this question, we derive and contrast formulas expressing the variance of
Y before and after addition of the new wage-setter, under the assumption that the X distributions
are identical with finite variance.
Table 8 reports the formulas for the Y variance, together with the change in the variance
from Time 1 to Time 2 and the proportional increase or decrease.  In Table 8, N denotes the
number of wage-setters prior to the coming of the new wage-setter.  For completeness, we
include the case where the new wage-setter has no power -- for example, a committee may
include one person who can enter the discussion but cannot vote; this situation is labeled (1). 
The situation where the new wage-setter has equal power and develops an independent
recommended wage distribution is labeled (2), and the case of the partisan new wage-setter is
labeled (3).  As shown, introducing an independent wage-setter reduces wage inequality; the
variance of Y declines by a factor of  , or a proportionate decrease of  . 
When the new wage-setter becomes a partisan of one of the original wage-setters, however, wage
inequality increases; it increases by the factor  , or a proportionate increase of
.
– Table 8 about here –
4.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAGE MODEL:
DISTRIBUTION-INDEPENDENT RESULTS
4.1.  Theorems on Inequality and Democracy
Three principles of democracy are fundamental.  First, the electorate – the governed who
give consent – should include as much of the population as possible.  Second, members of the
electorate should have equal votes.  Third, members of the electorate should be free to hold and
express their own opinions on all matters, and thus to agree or disagree with other members of  Classic debates focused on slavery, race, and gender.  Current controversies focus,
12
inter alia, on voting rights of citizens in prison and of noncitizen residents.
  Not all procedures in democratic countries conform to this rule.  Consider, for
13
example, the U.S. Senate, in which equal representation is of each state rather than each person.
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the body politic.
In earlier times, going back to antiquity, ideas about democracy and experiments with
democratic principles included only a small fraction of the governed, perhaps only men or only
free men or only property owners.  But the vision has steadily grown, so that increasingly the
electorate spans all adult citizens free of disabling cognitive impairments.   With respect to the
12
second principle, it is widely held that voters should count equally, as in “One person, one
vote.”   And with respect to the third principle, the right to hold and express a variety of
13
opinions has come to be seen as not only upholding the dignity and worth of every person but
also generating superior public policies, as ideas from every corner are examined, contrasted,
revised and refined (in a process not too different from scientific work). 
The question addressed in this section is:  How do these three fundamental principles of
democracy affect wage inequality?  To address the effect of the first principle, we examine the
effects of N the number of wage-setters on wage inequality.  To address the effect of the second
principle, we examine the effects of the pattern of weights on wage inequality (where, as
described in Section 2, the weights are nonnegative and sum to unity).  To address the effect of
the third principle, we examine the effects on wage inequality of type of micro consensus – viz.,
like-mindedness, independent-mindedness, and opposite-mindedness concerning the wages each
worker should receive.  If democracy reduces inequality, then (1) the effect of N should be
positive, namely, the larger the number of wage-setters, the lower the inequality, and (2)
inequality should be lower when the wage-setters’ weights are equal than when they are unequal. 
It is not obvious what the effects of type of micro consensus should be, given that the principle
allows freedom to agree or disagree.
THEOREM 1 (Wage Inequality and the Number of Wage-21
Setters):  The effect on wage inequality of the number of wage-
setters depends on the configuration of micro consensus, macro
consensus, and wage-setter power; increasing the number of wage-
setters can increase or decrease inequality or have no effect. 
Specifically:
THEOREM 1.1 (No Effect of the Number of Wage-Setters in
the Case of Perfect Micro and Macro Like-Mindedness):  Given
N wage-setters whose recommended wage distributions are
identical, have finite variances, and are perfectly positively
associated, inequality in the final wage distribution is exactly the
same as in the recommended wage distributions.  Formally: 
where the subscripts indicate the recommended and final wage
distributions.
THEOREM 1.2 (Effect of the Number of Wage-Setters in the
Case of Equally-Weighted, Independent-Minded Wage-
Setters):  Given N equally-weighted wage-setters whose
recommended wage distributions have equal means and finite
variances and are independent, inequality is a decreasing function
of the number of wage-setters.
THEOREM 1.3 (Effect of Introducing an Equally-Weighted
Wage-Setter into a Set of Independent-Minded, Equally-
Weighted Wage-Setters): Given N equally-weighted wage-setters
whose recommended wage distributions have equal means and
equal finite variances and are independent, increasing the number
of equally-empowered actors can have opposite effects -- can
either increase or decrease wage inequality -- conditional on the
(6)22
independence of mind of the incoming wage-setter.
Proof of Theorem 1.1:  We construct a simple proof based on the quantile function (QF):
As shown, given that the distributions are identical and the sum of weights must be unity, the QF
of the final wage distribution is the same as the QF of the recommended wage distributions. 
Finally, if X and Y have the same QF, they must have the same variance.
For an alternate proof, look at the formulas for Var(Y) in the top two rows of the left column in
Tables 6 and 7.  The formulas do not include N, and thus it is obvious that in these cases N has
no effect on Var(Y).
Proof of Theorem 1.2:  It is obvious from inspection of the formulas for Var(Y) in the
equal-weights/independent cases in Tables 6 and 7 that the first partial derivative of Var(Y) with
respect to N is negative.
Proof of Theorem 1.3:  This result follows from the formulas presented in Table 8
(panels B and C).
~ 
Remarks on Theorem 1.  Theorem 1.1 provides a benchmark, so to speak, against which
to gauge inequality reduction.  Note that neither the number of wage-setters nor their weights
affect inequality in this case.  Note also that the effects shown in Table 8 and used in the proof of
Theorem 1.3 are conditional on the number of wage-setters, leading to a theorem on population
size presented in Section 4.2 below.
THEOREM 2 (Wage Inequality and Wage-Setter Power):  The
effect on wage inequality of equal or unequal weights among the
(7)
(8)23
wage-setters depends on the configuration of micro consensus and
macro consensus; equal power can increase or decrease inequality
or have no effect.  Specifically:
THEOREM 2.1 (Effect of Wage-Setter Power in the Case of
Like-Minded Wage-Setters Whose Recommended Wage
Distributions Are Identical with Finite Variances):  Given N
wage-setters whose recommended wage distributions are identical,
have finite variances, and are perfectly positively associated,
inequality is the same whether the wage-setters have equal or
unequal power.
THEOREM 2.2 (Effect of Wage-Setter Power in the Case of
Independent-Minded Wage-Setters Whose Recommended
Wage Distributions Have Equal Finite Variances):  Given N
wage-setters whose recommended wage distributions have equal
finite variances and are independent, inequality is lower when the
wage-setters have equal power than when they are unequal.
THEOREM 2.3 (Effect of Wage-Setter Power in the Case of
Independent-Minded Wage-Setters Whose Recommended
Wage Distributions Have Equal Means and Different Finite
Variances):  Given N wage-setters whose recommended wage
distributions have equal means and different finite variances and
are independent, unequal weights can achieve a lower wage
inequality than equal weights, provided that the weights vary
inversely with the variances of the recommended wage
distributions.
THEOREM 2.4 (Effect of Wage-Setter Power in the Case of
Two Opposite-Minded Wage-Setters Whose Recommended  An alternate proof of Theorem 2.2 can be constructed by replacing the unequal
14
variances in the proof of Theorem 2.3 with equal variances.
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(9)
Wage Distributions Are Identical with Finite Variances): 
Given two wage-setters whose recommended wage distributions
are identical, have finite variances, and are perfectly negatively
associated, inequality is lower when the wage-setters have equal
power than when they are unequal.
Proof of Theorem 2.1:  The proof is the same as for Theorem 1.1.  Whether the weights
are equal or unequal, they still sum to unity.
Proof of Theorem 2.2:  The formulas in the top two rows in the middle column of Tables
6 and 7 indicate that the weights operate as an attenuation factor on the variance of Y.  Looking at
Table 7, in the case of equal weights, the attenuation factor is 1/N ; in the case of unequal
weights, the factor is the sum of the squared weights.  The sum of the squares of the weights is
minimized when the weights are equal, so that the attenuation factor is smaller in the equal-
weights case than in the unequal-weights case.  Hence, Var(Y) is smaller in the equal-weights
case than in the unequal-weights case.
Proof of Theorem 2.3:  The proof is based on the optimal weights result in Kotz,
Johnson, and Read (1985).  The variance of a weighted average, where the component
distributions have equal means, is minimized, with respect to the weights, when each weight,
, is the following decreasing function of the corresponding variance:
Intuitively, if larger weights are associated with smaller X variances, then unequal weights lead to
a smaller Y variance than do equal weights.  Put differently, wage inequality declines if the
proponents of low-inequality wage schemes are more powerful than the proponents of high-
inequality wage schemes.
1425
Proof of Theorem 2.4:  Look at the top two rows of the right column in Table 6.  Each
formula has two terms, and both terms include the weights.  In the lefthand term, Var(X) is
multiplied by the sum of the squared weights.  The sum of the squared weights (where the
weights are nonnegative and sum to unity) is minimized when the weights are equal.  Hence, the
lefthand term is smaller when the weights are equal.  Meanwhile, the righthand term includes the
product of the weights as a multiplier of the covariance.  In this case of perfect negative
association, the covariance is negative, and thus the righthand term is negative.  The product of
the weights is maximized when the weights are equal.  Hence, the righthand term is larger (but of
negative sign) when the weights are equal.  Therefore, via the operation of both terms, Var(Y) is
minimized when the weights are equal.
~
Remarks on Theorem 2.  We shall encounter again the evocative theme of Theorems 2.2
and 2.4 – the closer the weights to equality, the lower the wage inequality.  Meanwhile, Theorem
2 strengthens the foundation for analyzing the part played by the principle of equal power in the
operation of wage inequality.  Whether equal power increases or decreases wage inequality or
has no effect depends on the configuration of types of micro and macro consensus.
THEOREM 3 (Wage Inequality and Micro Consensus):  Given
N wage-setters whose recommended wage distributions have finite
variances, inequality in the final wage distribution is lower when
the wage-setters are independent-minded than when they are like-
minded and lower still when they are opposite-minded.  Formally: 
where the superscripts indicate the type of micro consensus, that
is, whether the recommended wage distributions are positively
associated, independent, or negatively associated.
Proof:  The variance of a weighted sum is written (Table 7, panel A):
(10)26
where the covariance may be written:
When the   distributions are mutually independent – the case portrayed in the middle columns
of Tables 3, 4, 6, and 7 – the covariance equals zero and the rightmost term in the formula for
Var(Y) drops out.  When the  distributions are positively associated, the covariance term is
positive and Var(Y) will exceed that in the independent case; and when the  distributions are
negatively associated (in the sense that the sum of the weighted covariances is negative, as
discussed in Section 3), the covariance term is negative and Var(Y) will be smaller than in the
independent case.
~  
Accordingly, within each row of Tables 3, 4, 6, and 7, inequality declines from left to
right.  Note that Theorem 3 holds whether the weights are equal or unequal and, of course,
whether the recommended wage distributions are identical or different.  Note also that the
relation in expression (10) holds for any magnitude of positive or negative association (including 
the two perfect extreme types highlighted in much of this paper).
Thus, Theorem 3 provides a strong and pristine result, without the contingencies of
Theorems 1 and 2.  Independence of mind reduces wage inequality, and dissent does so even
more.
4.2.  Theorem on Population Size
THEOREM 4 (Democracy and Demography):  Given N equally-
weighted wage-setters whose recommended wage distributions
have equal means and equal finite variances and are independent,
the reduction in wage inequality that occurs as a result of
introducing an independent wage-setter grows smaller as N
increases; and, similarly, the increase in wage inequality that
(11)
(12)  Theorem 4 could be considered a corollary to Theorem 1.3.  It is reported separately
15
both so as not to disrupt the flow of Theorems 1-3 and because population size is important in its
own right.
  Note that the population size in the two key settings associated with the rise of the
16
democratic spirit -- Greek city-states and American colonial towns -- was relatively small.
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occurs as a result of introducing a partisan wage-setter also grows
smaller as N increases. 
Proof:  It is obvious from the formulas in Table 8 (panel C) that the decrease in wage




 Thus, when the group of wage-setters is very large, the effects of introducing a new
wage-setter are small, whether the new wage-setter is independent or a partisan of one of the
original wage-setters.  This result suggests that arguments for independent thinking will be more
vigorous in small societies than in large societies.
16
4.3.  Theorems on Consensus and Inequality
As discussed in Section 2.3, the case where there are M factions is formally equivalent --
in its effects on wage inequality -- to the case where there are   wage-setters.  Thus, it would
appear that even if each faction has thousands of wage-setters, their presence does not contribute
to the reduction of wage inequality.  To make their voices "count," they would have to develop
an independent or opposite mind and leave the faction.  Of course, the power configuration, in
the form of the   and the   , also plays a part.
The equivalence of the wage-setter case and the faction case is expressed formally:
THEOREM 5 (Identical Effects of C Independent Wage-
Setters and C Independent Wage-Setting Factions):  The
variance of Y is the same under two distinct systems:  (1) a system
where there are C independent wage-setters and no one else has
any power, and (2) a system where there are C independent28
factions, and the recommended wage distributions and weights of
the factions replicate the recommended wage distributions and
weights of the C wage-setters.
Proof:  This is a basic feature of the model’s construction.
~  
To illustrate, consider a triumvirate in which each wage-setter has weight equal to 1/3. 
Suppose that the society switches to a democratic regime, so that thousands of workers become
wage-setters.  If the new wage-setters align themselves in equal numbers with each member of
the triumvirate, so that there are now three independent factions, each with a single
recommended wage distribution, then the variance of Y remains unchanged.
Similarly, if the original triumvirate has weights of ½, 1/4, and 1/4 and the new wage-
setters align themselves in those proportions -- half with the leader whose weight was ½, one-
quarter each with the other two leaders -- then, again, the variance of Y remains unchanged.
Thus, there is no reduction in wage inequality to accompany increases in the number of
partisan wage-setters, as there is when the number of independent wage-setters increases
(Theorem 1.2).  This has striking real-world implications.  The hope that increasing the number
of voters will reduce economic inequality can be dashed, absent independence of mind or a
degree of dissent.
The case of full agreement and dictatorship merits its own theorem:
THEOREM 6 (Equivalence of Dictatorship and Full
Micro/Macro Agreement):  In terms of wage inequality, a society
in which everyone agrees on the recommended wage distribution
and on the wage amounts for particular workers is equivalent to a
society governed by a dictator.
Proof:  It is evident from Tables 6 and 7 that a society with N wage-setters whose
recommended wage distributions are identical and perfectly positively associated leads to exactly
the same Var(Y) as a society with a single wage-setter.  In both cases, Var(Y) equals Var(X).29
~
4.4.  Gregory the Great and the Sinless World
When would wage inequality equal zero?  Gregory the Great ([540-604] 1844) observes
in his famous principle (Moralia in Job, xxi), "Where there is no sin, there is no inequality." 
While Gregory did not argue for the converse, we take logical license and pay tribute to Gregory
the Great, calling a world without inequality a world without sin:
THEOREM 7 (Sinless World):  The final wage distribution is
Equal – that is, has zero inequality – when (1) the number of wage-
setters is two, (2) they are perfectly opposite-minded, (3) their
recommended wage distributions have a correlation of -1, and (4)
either (4a) the two recommended wage distributions are identical
and equally-weighted, or (4b) the two recommended wage
distributions are different and unequally-weighted and the ratio of
their weights is the inverse of the ratio of  their standard
deviations.
  Proof:  The proof is based on simple algebraic manipulation of the formulas in Table 6
and the optimal weights result in Kotz, Johnson, and Read (1985).  For example, to prove the
part including condition 4a, it is straightforward to show that the formula for Var(Y) in the case
of two identical recommended wage distributions with unequal weights reduces to:
Accordingly, Var(Y) equals zero when the weights are equal.
~
Of course, as will be seen in Theorem 13, a benevolent dictator can also produce a wage
distribution with zero inequality.
4.5.  Theorems on Political Parties
George Washington did not like political parties.  He feared that they would destroy the
Union, writing urgently in his Farewell Address (1796): “Let me . . . warn you in the most
(13)30
solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally.”  We might ask about
the fate of wage inequality in societies with political parties whose policies generate the wage
distribution.  As noted earlier, the wage model developed in this paper applies to political parties
in the case where final outcomes can be represented as a weighted average of the policies of all
the parties.  This occurs in explicit proportional-representation systems, and, given party
alignments and the ebb and flow of party dominance, may occur as well in systems where, in
principle, the dominant party could set policy alone.
All the theorems presented above thus apply to political parties.  For example, Theorem
1.2 may be re-expressed as follows:
THEOREM 8 (Effect of the Number of Parties in the Case of
Independent-Minded Parties of Equal Relative Size):  Given N
parties of equal relative size and with associated potential wage
distributions which have equal means and finite variances and are
independent, inequality is a decreasing function of the number of
parties.
Similarly, Theorem 3 may be re-expressed as follows:
THEOREM 9 (Inequality and Micro Agreement):  Given N
political parties with associated potential wage distributions of
finite variance, inequality in the final wage distribution is lower
when the parties are independent-minded than when they are like-
minded and lower still when they are opposite-minded.  Formally: 
where the superscripts indicate the type of micro consensus, that
is, whether the associated potential wage distributions are
positively associated, independent, or negatively associated.
Of course, political parties, in contrast to individuals, are not particularly prone to be like-
minded, and thus the practical import of Theorem 9 is the superiority of dissent versus
(14)31
independence in achieving inequality reduction.  Note that Theorems 8 and 9 may be useful in
analyzing multi-party traditions in Europe and around the world.
In the remainder of this section, we focus on two-party systems.
THEOREM 10 (Two-Party Systems, Dissent, and Inequality): 
Given a two-party system, holding constant party relative size,
wage inequality is minimized when the two parties advocate
policies that are directly opposite each other.
  Proof:  The proof follows from Theorem 9 and the proof of Theorem 3 on which
Theorem 9 is based.
~
THEOREM 11 (Two-Party Systems, Party Relative Size, and
Inequality):  Given a two-party system and associated potential
wage distributions that are either (1) independent with equal finite
variances or (2) identical with finite variances and perfectly
negatively associated, wage inequality is minimized when the two
parties are of equal relative size.
  Proof:  The proof follows from the proofs of Theorems 2.2 and 2.4, on which Theorem
11 is based.
~
Theorem 7 on Gregory the Great and the sinless world leads directly to a theorem on the
Workers’ Paradise:
THEOREM 12 (Two-Party Systems and the Workers’
Paradise):  The final wage distribution in a two-party system is
Equal – that is, has zero inequality – when (1) the two parties are
perfectly opposite-minded, (2) their associated potential wage
distributions have a correlation of -1, and (3) either (3a) the wage
distributions are identical and the two parties have equal power,32
or (3a) the wage distributions are different and the two parties
have unequal strength and the ratio of their relative size is the
inverse of the ratio of the distributions’ standard deviations.
  Proof:  The proof follows from the proof of Theorem 7, on which Theorem 12 is based.
4.6.  Theorem on Dictatorship
It is obvious by now that there are conditions under which that fabled figure – the
benevolent dictator -- can minimize inequality, echoing centuries of social thought since Plato
(Republic; Laws, Book IV).  Formally:
THEOREM 13 (Benevolent Dictator):  Rule by a single wage-
setter minimizes wage inequality if and only if either (1) that wage-
setter’s recommended wage distribution is Equal, or (2) that wage-
setter’s recommended wage distribution has the lowest inequality
and there is no pair of potential wage-setters generating an Equal
wage distribution (i.e., satisfying Theorem 7).
  Proof: A proof can be constructed based on the results in Tables 6 and 7.
~
4.7.  Theorems on the Shape of the Wage Distribution
What determines the shape of the wage distribution?  This classic question, whose roots
stretch at least as far back as John Chrysostom’s (386-407 [1860]) estimation of the proportions
rich, poor, and in the middle in the city of Antioch, has fired the imagination in every age
(Ammon 1899; Pigou 1924; Lebergott 1959; Kleiber and Kotz 2003).  The wage model analyzed
in this paper yields a pertinent result:
THEOREM 14 (Number of Wage-Setters and Normality of the
Wage Distribution):  As the number of independent wage-setters
increases (where the component recommended distributions have
finite variances), the shape of the wage distribution tends to
normality.  Famous examples of mixtures of normal distributions include Galton's normal
17
mixture of normals (sketched by Edgeworth) and Karl Pearson's bimodal mixture of two
normals.  For formulas and graphs, see Everitt (1985) and Stigler (1986:312).
33
  Proof:  The proof relies on the version of the central limit theorem owed to Liapunov
(1900, 1901), as strengthened by Lindeberg and Feller, where the component independent
variates may have different distributions, provided that they have finite variances (Stuart and Ord
1987; Wolfson 1985).
~
Thus, according to the wage-determination account outlined in this paper, if the wage
distribution is not normal, it must be because the number of wage-setters is small or because the
wage-setters are not independent.
Note, however, that our model is consistent with a situation in which wage-setting may
occur in separate groups.  For example, in a university, each department may conduct its separate
wage-setting activity.  Similarly, wage-setting may be confined to occupations, to firms, to
sectors, or to political jurisdictions.  Thus, Theorem 14  is confined to the entity within which
wage-setting occurs.
Suppose that within each wage-setting entity the wage distribution is normal.  What then
would be the shape of the overall wage distribution?  This is a problem in pooling distributions,
and the shape of the overall distribution would depend on the number, mean, and variance of the
component distributions and the share of the total population in each.  In general, the density
function of a mixture of a finite number of normals is easy to write, but the parameters are not
always easy to derive.  Moreover, the mixture distribution may exhibit a wide variety of shapes,
including the normal, and it may be unimodal or multimodal.   Thus, a non-normal wage
17
distribution is not inconsistent with normal wage distributions within wage-setting entities. 
Formally:
THEOREM 15 (Multiple Groups and Non-Normality of the
Wage Distribution): If wage-setting occurs in separate groups,34
the within-group wage distributions may be normal but the overall
wage distribution nonnormal.
  Proof: The proof is based on standard statistical results, as sketched above.
~
Remark on Theorem 15.  If the separate groups within which wage-setting occurs are
characterized by different configuration of the relevant factors – number of wage-setters,
configuration of wage-setter power, micro and macro consensus – then it is easy to imagine that
the wage distribution may, or may not, be normal within wage-setting context and that the
ensuing cross-context mixtures produce, as Jasso and Kotz (2007:321) put it, “a dazzling
diversity of shapes”.  Wage distributions will be symmetrical and asymmetrical, unimodal and
multimodal, narrow and wide, short and tall.  There will be Mexican hats and fedoras, bowler
hats and top hats.
5.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAGE MODEL:
RESULTS BASED ON CONTINUOUS PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS
As shown above, the number of wage-setters, their agreements and disagreements, and
their relative power combine to produce the inequality in the wage distribution.  For example,
given independent-minded and equally-weighted wage-setters whose recommended wage
distributions have finite variances, as the number of wage-setters increases, the inequality in the
final wage distribution decreases (Theorem 1.2) and the distribution tends to normality (Theorem
14).  And dissent is the tool par excellence for reducing inequality, followed by independence of
mind (Theorem 3).  We now explore the wage model using continuous univariate probability
distributions.  In this initial exploration, the situation is simple and the distribution highly
tractable, but more elaborate situations can be analyzed in the future.
5.1.  Setup
To begin, and as above, let there be N wage-setters.  Let the wage distributions
recommended by the N wage-setters be identical – that is, there is macro agreement – and with  Military units are a good example.  For example, in the officer grades, the number of
18
slots decreases with rank; thus, there are fewer generals than colonels, fewer colonels than
35
finite variances.  The first task is to select a modeling distribution for the wage-setter-specific
distribution.  The main requirement for the modeling distribution is that it be defined on the
positive support, ideally with a positive infimum (so as to represent a situation with a minimum
wage).  The modeling distribution need not be any of the modeling distributions commonly used
to represent the income distribution (see, for example, the distributions discussed by Dagum
(1985) and by Kleiber and Kotz (2003)), for, as discussed above and in Jasso and Kotz
(2007:321), the income distribution routinely modeled may be a mixture of many wage
distributions, each specific to a wage-setting context.
Modeling distribution for each wage-setter’s recommended wage distribution – the
shifted exponential.  To model the wage-setter-specific recommended wage distributions, we
choose the exponential with location parameter a equal to the positive infimum and with scale
parameter set at unity (Johnson, Kotz, and Balakrishnan 1994:494).  The probability density
function (PDF) for this shifted exponential is given by:
The exponential has several advantages.  First, it has been extensively studied, so that its
properties and relations to other variates are well established (see, for example, Galambos and
Kotz (1978), Johnson, Kotz, and Balakrishnan (1994:494-572), and the references cited therein). 
Second, it is highly tractable.  Third, in the study of heavy tails, the exponential emerges, along
with the gammas, as intermediate between the light-tailed distributions and the heavy-tailed
distributions, by several criteria for classifying distributions.  As Bryson (1985:598) puts it, “the
exponential and gamma families seem to occupy a middle ground”.  Fourth, the exponential
provides a natural model for situations in which supply and demand considerations are important
and wage increases at an increasing rate with relative rank, as noted by Jasso and Kotz
(2007:320).  Fifth, the exponential also provides a natural way to represent work units in which
the number of workers is smaller, the greater the skill or experience.   The exponential thus
18
(15)lieutenant colonels, fewer lieutenant colonels than majors, etc. (Rostker, Thie, Lacy, Kawata, and
Purnell 1993).  Moreover, across entire military units, the number of enlisted is always greater
than the number of officers – producing the E/O ratio which, for example, in the United States
during World War II stood at ten.  Recent decreases in the E/O ratio have spurred debates
concerning the “officer bloat” and the possibility that modern warfare requires lower E/O ratios. 
We note that academic departments with more full professors than assistant professors (or even
than more assistant and associate professors combined) refer to themselves rather more
generously as “topheavy”. 
  In fact, as Johnson, Kotz, and Balakrishnan (1994:340) note, the reproductive property
19
holds even if the gammas in the sum have different shape parameters.  Given selection of the
exponential as the modeling distribution for each wage-setter’s recommended wage distribution,
this analysis does not make use of that property.  Future research, however, might explore a
situation in which the wage-setters’ distributions can be modeled by gammas with different shape
36
seems an ideal modeling distribution for this initial exploration.
Next, we derive the distributions for some pertinent special cases that arise when the
wage-setters’ recommended wage distributions are shifted exponentials.  As above, the wage-
setters may be equally or unequally weighted, and their recommended wage distributions may be
related in three main ways – they may be perfectly positively associated, independent, or
perfectly negatively associated.
5.2.  The Case of Perfectly-Positively-Associated Shifted Exponentials 
In the case of perfect positive association, the final wage distribution – the weighted sum
of the N shifted exponentials – remains unchanged.  It is the same original shifted exponential
whose PDF is given in expression (15).  Whether the weights are equal or unequal does not
matter.  This result is well-known and has been widely used (e.g., in derivation of multi-good
status distributions (Jasso 2001; Jasso and Kotz 2007)).  However, if a proof is desired, a simple
proof along the lines of the proof for Theorem 1.1 can be constructed.
5.3.  The Case of Independent Shifted Exponentials
5.3.1.  The Case of Independent/Equally-Weighted Shifted Exponentials 
As is well known, the exponential is the special case of a gamma arising when the
gamma’s shape parameter equals unity.  By the special “reproductive property,” the sum of
independent and identically distributed (iid) exponentials is a gamma with shape parameter equal
to the number of variates in the sum (Johnson, Kotz, and Balakrishnan 1994:340).   Thus, the
19parameters.
  The power N  to which the initial factor in the numerator of the PDF of Y in (17) is
20
raised is not a new occurrence of N, but it is invisible in equation (16) because the scale factor in
the PDF in (16) is equal to unity.
37
PDF of the sum of these iid shifted exponentials is given by:
where, as before, a denotes the infimum, and the shape parameter (usually denoted by some other
letter) is here denoted by N, to indicate its interpretation in the wage model.  When the shape
parameter is an integer, the distribution is known as the Erlang.  In this case, given that the
number of wage-setters N (i.e., the number of exponentials) must be an integer, the distribution is
an Erlang.
Of course, we require the average of the N variates, rather than their sum, and so we carry
out a change-of-variable to obtain the PDF of the final wage distribution Y:
Inspection of the formula for the PDF reveals that the distribution is also Erlang, with a new
scale parameter, formerly unity but now equal to the reciprocal of N, embodied in the two new
occurrences of N (the initial factor N and the multiplier N in the argument of the exponential
function, both in the numerator).  Cognizant of the location parameter, we call it the shifted
Erlang.
20
Accordingly, because the distribution arising from the average of N independent and
identical exponentials is Erlang, we already know many of its properties.  First, the mean is equal
to the sum of 1 (the mean of the standard exponential) and the infimum a.  The mode and median
are each a sum of a and a monotonic function of N .  The variance, which is of particular interest,
is a monotonic function of N – viz., 1/N.  Finally, the formula for the Gini coefficient turns out to
be a simple modification of a well-known formula for the unshifted Erlang and gamma
(16)
(17)38
distributions (see, for example, McDonald and Jensen (1979:856), Johnson, Kotz, and
Balakrishnan (1994:341), Kleiber and Kotz (2003:164), and Jasso and Kotz (2007)):
where N denotes the number of wage-setters, a denotes the minimum wage, and the modification
consists of attaching the simple righthand factor to adjust for the shift in the origin.  This is only
the first of many formulas which include the shift factor (1/(a+1)), which, being a proper
fraction, serves to attenuate the quantity.
The first partial derivatives of the variance and the Gini coefficient with respect to N are
negative, indicating that, as N increases, both the variance and the Gini coefficient decrease. 
Moreover, their left limits are both zero.  Thus, in this case of equally-weighted independent
shifted exponentials, as expected from Theorem 1.2, both the variance and the Gini coefficient
approach zero as N 6 4.
Table 9 reports the PDF, variance, and Gini coefficient in the shifted Erlang arising from
identical, independently distributed, and equally-weighted shifted exponentials for N the number
of wage-setters from 1 to 10.  As shown, both indicators of inequality diminish quickly.  The
variance, which is 1 in the exponential, is cut in half with the addition of a single new
independent wage-setter, and by 5 wage-setters it registers .2.  Ignoring the shift factor (1/(a+1)),
the Gini coefficient, which is .5 in the unshifted exponential, declines to .375 when N equals 2;
by 5 wage-setters it is approximately .246, and by 10 wage-setters, it has declined to .176.  Of
course, taking into account the shift factor reduces all these values of the Gini coefficient still
more.
– Table 9 about here –
To provide visual illustration and to solve for the mode and median, we set the parameter
a to .25.  Table 10 reports the median and mode and, for contrast, the mean, for values of N from
1 to 10.  Figure 1 depicts the PDF of the ten Erlangs.  It is visually obvious that as the number of
wage-setters increases, the distribution grows progressively more concentrated.
(18)39
– Table 10 about here –
– Figure 1 about here –
Table 10 also shows that the mean, median, and mode display the pattern characteristic of
right-skewed gamma distributions (Groeneveld and Meeden 1977; MacGillivray 1985) – namely,
the mean is greater than the median, and the median is greater than the mode.
Finally, it is also evident from Figure 1 that as the number of wage-setters increases, the
variate tends more and more to the normality expected of the gamma family (Johnson, Kotz, and
Balakrishnan 1994:340) and expected as well from the central limit theorem in Theorem 14. 
Yet, however expected, it is striking how quickly the Erlang takes on the shape of the normal. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the phrase “domain of attraction” has come to be used to refer to the
set of distributions that tend to a particular other distribution.  The Erlang, together with all
distributions with finite variance, “is in the domain of attraction to the normal,” as Stout
(1985:417) evocatively puts it.
5.3.2.  The Case of Independent/Unequally-Weighted Shifted Exponentials
When the iid exponentials are unequally weighted, the ensuing distribution is known as a
general Erlang or a general gamma.  The formula for the PDF in the unshifted case is reported by
Johnson and Kotz (1970:222) and, more recently, by Johnson, Kotz, and Balakrishnan
(1994:552).  The PDF for the shifted general Erlang is only a minor modification, namely:
Using this formula as a starting point, we derived the formula for the special case of two
wage-setters with any combination of unequal weights.  Because in this case, the two weights
may be thought of as the party split p, where p represents one party’s proportion of the




Figure 2 depicts the PDF of four shifted general Erlangs corresponding to two parties
with values of the party split p of .1, .2, .3, and .4.  Figure 2 also includes the PDF of the shifted
Erlang corresponding to two equally-weighted wage-setters (already shown in Figure 1).
– Figure 2 about here –
Working with expression (20), we obtained the formula for the Gini coefficient in this
special two-N/independent/unequally-weighted shifted general Erlang, which turns out to be
beautiful and spartan:
Recall that the Gini coefficient for the independent/equally-weighted Erlang case at N = 2
is .375 times the shift factor (Table 9).  Using formula (21), it is straightforward to establish that
the limits of the Gini coefficient as p goes from zero to .5 are .5 and .375 (again in each instance
multiplied by the shift factor).  Taking the derivative of (21) with respect to p shows that
inequality is at a minimum when the population (or legislature) is evenly divided between the
two parties.  This result, expected from Theorem 11, is not without practical importance. 
Commentators concerned about such exact splitting of the electorate may take comfort in its
effects on wage inequality.
5.4.  The Case of Perfectly-Negatively-Associated Shifted Exponentials
5.4.1.  The Case of Perfectly-Negatively-Associated/Equally-Weighted Shifted Exponentials
A pair of equally-weighted shifted exponentials that are perfectly negatively associated
gives rise to a shifted version of the ring(2)-exponential variate obtained by Jasso (2001) and
analyzed by Jasso and Kotz (2007).  As would be expected from the original ring(2)-exponential,
an important feature of this variate is that its lower extreme value shifts upward – in this case to
(a + ln(2)) or approximately a + .693.  Concomitantly, inequality declines perceptibly.  Ignoring
the shift factor, the Gini coefficient, which registers .5 in the perfectly-positively-associated case
and .375 in the case of two independent wage-setters, declines to (ln(2) - ½) or approximately
.193 in the negative-association case.  As expected from Theorem 10, dissent dramatically
(21)41
reduces inequality.
5.4.2.  The Case of Perfectly-Negatively-Associated/Unequally-Weighted
Shifted Exponentials
To define the case of N negatively-associated recommended wage distributions, we
follow Jasso and Kotz (2007), who adopt the principle of organized subsets proposed by Berger
et al. (1977:126-127), and apply the principle as follows:  (i) the N wage-setters are arranged in
two factions; (ii) within each faction, the wage-setters are perfectly positively associated; and (iii)
the two factions are perfectly negatively associated.  This case gives rise to a shifted version of
the mirror-exponential variate introduced by Jasso and Kotz (2007).  As in the original mirror-
exponential, there is an expression for the quantile function but none for the PDF or the CDF. 
The formula for the QF is given by:
which differs from the QF for the original unshifted mirror-exponential only by the addition of
the initial righthandside factor a (the infimum, representing minimum wage).
The Gini coefficient is given by:
This differs from the formula for the original unshifted mirror-exponential only in the shift factor
(1/(a+1)).
5.5.  Effects of Like-/Independent-/Opposite-Mindedness:  Contrasting the Shifted
Exponential, Shifted Erlang, Shifted General Erlang, and Shifted Mirror-Exponential
Table 11 collects the formulas for the major quantities associated with the three variates
representing the final wage distribution in the case of two equally-weighted wage-setters – the
shifted exponential in the positive-association case, the shifted Erlang in the independent case,
and the shifted ring(2)-exponential in the negative-association case.  Figure 3 depicts the PDFs of
the three variates (the shifted exponential also appears in Figure 1, and the shifted Erlang in both
Figures 1 and 2).
(22)
(23)42
– Table 11 about here –
– Figure 3 about here –
It is evident from Table 11 and Figure 3 that inequality declines as we progress from like-
mindedness to independent-mindedness to opposite-mindedness, illustrating Theorems 3, 9, and
10.  For example, as already noted, the Gini coefficient (Table 11, bottom row) declines, ignoring
the shift factor, from .5 to .375 to .193.  As an instrument for reducing inequality, being at
loggerheads appears to have no peer.
Table 12 summarizes the variates obtained for all six cases – including the three unequal-
weights cases as well as the equal-weights cases described in Table 11 and depicted in Figure 3.
– Table 12 about here –
To examine the case of unequal weights – that is, the case in which the party split departs
from .5 – we report in Table 13 the Gini coefficient in the final wage distribution for the shifted
exponential, the shifted general Erlang, and the shifted mirror-exponential for party splits from
.05 to .5.  First, as expected from Theorems 3, 9, and 10, inequality declines from left to right
across the table, going from like-mindedness to independent-mindedness to opposite-
mindedness.  Second, as expected from Theorem 11, in the independent and negative-association
cases, the Gini coefficient declines as the two parties become more evenly divided.  Figure 4
depicts both the consensus effect and the party split effect.
– Table 13 about here –
– Figure 4 about here –
6.  CONCLUDING NOTE
This paper proposes a new model of wage determination and wage inequality.  In this
model, wage-setters set workers’ wages, and there are three key features:  (1) the number of
wage-setters may vary; (2) some wage-setters may count more than others; and (3) wage-setters
may disagree with each other on both the wage distribution and the amounts recommended for
particular workers.43
As shown above, the number of wage-setters, their agreements and disagreements, and
their relative power combine to produce the inequality in the wage distribution.  For example,
given independent-minded and equally-weighted wage-setters whose recommended wage
distributions have finite variances, as the number of wage-setters increases, the inequality in the
final wage distribution decreases (Theorem 1.2) and the distribution tends to normality (Theorem
14).  An important result, both for its generality and its substance, is that dissent is the
preeminent tool for reducing inequality, followed by independence of mind (Theorem 3).  Thus,
when leaders of democratic nations seek to forge an economic consensus they are unwittingly
inducing greater economic inequality.
New avenues for research include both theoretical and empirical work.  Theoretically, it
will be possible to derive many further implications for special cases, including:  (1) wage-setting
situations where all recommended wage distributions must preserve the current rank-ordering;
(2) the case where the variates are independently and identically distributed, as in Section 5, but
drawn from a family other than the exponential; and (3) the case where the variates are
independent but not identical, in particular, drawn from two different families, as in the case
recently investigated by Nadarajah and Kotz (2005).  Finally, it will be useful to explore mixture
distributions for modeling the wage distribution in large populations which incorporate several
wage-setting entities.
Empirically, the model can be applied and tested in a variety of ways.  These include a
new emphasis on the behavior of wage-setters.  While most studies of wage attainment focus on
the characteristics of workers, the new model suggests that it might be worthwhile to focus on the
characteristics of wage-setters.  Moreover, not only are the characteristics of wage-setters
potentially important but so also is their network of social relations, in particular, the processes
that lead to agreement and disagreement among them.  Further, the structural features of the
wage-setting situation, especially the decision rule that gives some wage-setters more power than
others, might profit from scrutiny.
Future research might also use the wage model to examine historical experience with44
benevolent dictators, duarchies, utopian experiments, and the totalitarian forms to which they
sometimes lead.
Another way to empirically assess the wage model is to examine data on ideas of just
earnings, in particular (1) data collected by the International Social Science Programme (ISSP),
and (2) data collected via factorial survey methods.  The ISSP has asked respondents, via the
Inequality Modules fielded in 1987, 1992, and 1999, to provide the just earnings for sets of 9-11
occupations (for a list of the occupational titles, see Jasso 2007:229).  Factorial surveys of just
earnings have been carried out since Jasso and Rossi (1977).  These studies yield matrices that
assemble the earnings regarded as just for a set of fictitious workers by a set of respondents, and
enable estimation of respondent-specific just earnings functions and just earnings distributions
and their parameters (Jasso 1994; Jasso 2006a:379-407; Osberg and Smeeding 2006).  Published
fragments of just earnings matrices include those reported in Jasso (2006a:389-392) and Jasso
and Meyersson (2007:133).
As a quick prelude to future work, we cast into wage-model matrix form one of the
factorial survey data decks analyzed in Jasso (2006b) – where 23 respondents each form a just
earnings amount for each of 20 fictitious workers, generating 23 recommended wage
distributions and 253 covariances.  These data reveal the pervasive individualism enshrined in
Hatfield’s (Walster et al. 1976:4) principle.  Of the 253 covariances, 50 are negative (19.8
percent).  Moreover, the final wage distribution (i.e., where each worker’s wage is the average of
the 23 recommended wage amounts) has a smaller variance than all but two of the respondent-
specific recommended wage distributions.  Thus, if these respondents’ ideas of just earnings
became their recommended wage distributions, then, as expected from Theorem 3, their
disagreements would attenuate final wage inequality.
Turning to the larger question of democracy and inequality, since Plato and Aristotle, it
has been a useful and appealing exercise to rank-order the forms of government according to
their potential for increasing the common good.  In that spirit, we provide the rank-ordering
implied by the new wage model from the special vantage point of minimizing inequality.  To be45
sure, the common good means much more than inequality reduction.  Yet, as noted above, since
antiquity, inequality has aroused suspicions and the impulse to “correct” it (Aristotle, Politics,
Book II, Chapter 9). 
Here then is the inequality-minimizing rank-ordering implied by the new wage model:
1.  Perfect Equality (Gregory the Great’s Sinless World).  Perfect equality is possible in
the following regimes:
1.1.  The Benevolent Dictator Regime.  Provided that the wage distribution recommended
by the benevolent dictator is an Equal distribution.  [Theorem 13]
1.2.  A Duarchy.  Provided that there is perfect dissent and the two recommended wage
distributions have a correlation of -1, and either of the following conditions is satisfied
1.2.1.  The two recommended wage distributions are identical and the two wage-setters
have equal power, or
1.2.2.  The two recommended wage distributions are different and the two wage-setters
have unequal power and the ratio of their weights in the inverse of the ratio of their standard
deviations.  [Theorems 7 and 12]
2.  Inequality Minimization.  Inequality is minimized, but not completely eradicated, in
the following regimes:
2.1.  The Benevolent Dictator Regime.  Provided that the wage distribution recommended
by the benevolent dictator has the lowest inequality of all recommended wage distributions.
[Theorem 13]
2.2.  Democracy.  Provided that the democracy has a fixed income distribution (in the
anonymous sense) and the wage-setters exhibit independence of mind.  [Theorem 1.2]
2.3.  Regime with Unequally-Empowered Wage-Setters.  Provided that inequality in the
recommended wage distributions varies inversely with power.  [Theorem 2.3]
Finally, note that the top contenders, with the exception of the Benevolent Dictator,
combine elements of different forms of government, consistent with the classic appeal of mixed
government (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-I, Q. 105, art. 1) . 46
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A.  The Wage-Setter-Specific/Worker-Specific Wage
where x denotes the recommended wage, and the wage-setters are indexed by i (i = 1,..., N) 
and the workers by j (j = 1,..., J).
B.  Wage Matrix
C.  The Case of a Single Wage-Setter
If there is only one wage-setter, the wage matrix collapses to a vector:Table 2.  The Weight Matrix: N Wage-Setters and J Workers
A.  The Wage-Setter-Specific/Worker-Specific Weight
where w denotes the weight, the wage-setters are indexed by i (i = 1,..., N)  and the workers by
j (j = 1,..., J), and the weights are nonnegative and for each worker sum to one.  That is,
 and  .
B.  Weight Matrix
C.  The Case of a Wage-Setter with Absolute Power
If one wage-setter has absolute power, the weight matrix collapses to a vector:
D.  The Case of a Single Weighting Scheme for All Workers
If weights do not differ by worker, the weight matrix collapses to a vector:Table 3.  Types of Consensus in the Case of Two Wage-Setters, by Whether the
     Recommended Wage Distributions Are Identical or Different and the Association
     Between the Two Distributions
Macro
Consensus
12 Micro Consensus:  Association Between X  and X
Perfect Positive Independent Perfect Negative
















Notes:  Extension to N distributions is straightforward except for the two cases of perfect
negative association.  As described in the text, the N-variate perfect-negative-association case is
specified as follows:  (i) there are N wage-setters, arranged in two factions; (ii) within each
faction, all the recommended wage distributions are perfectly positively associated; and (iii) the
two factions are perfectly negatively associated with each other.Table 4.  Six Wage Matrices:  Two Wage-Setters and Four Workers
Macro
Consensus
12 Micro Consensus:  Association Between X  and X
Perfect Positive Independent Perfect Negative
12 X  and X
Identical
12 X  and X
DifferentTable 5.  Basic Structure of the Wage Determination Model
Elements of the Wage Model Mathematical Representation
wage-setters’ recommendations variates 
number of wage-setters number N
wage-setter power variate weights 
macro consensus identical/different variates
micro consensus association between variatesTable 6.  Formulas for the Variance of the Final Salary Distribution in the Case of Two Wage-Setters
Macro Consensus/
Wage-Setter Power
Micro Consensus:  Association Between the Recommended Wage Distributions   and 
Perfect Positive Independent Perfect Negative
A.  General Formula for the Variance of the Weighted Sum of Two Recommended Wage Distributions
B.  Specific Formulas for Main Special Cases
 and  Identical
Equal Weights
 and  Identical
Unequal Weights
 and  Different
Equal Weights
 and  Different
Unequal Weights Formula in A Formula in A
Note:  The covariance term is positive in the positive-association cases and negative in the negative-association cases.Table 7.  Formulas for the Variance of the Final Salary Distribution in the Case of N Wage-Setters
Macro Consensus/
Wage-Setter Power
Micro Consensus:  Association Between the Recommended Wage Distributions 
Perfect Positive Independent Negative
A.  General Formula for the Variance of the Weighted Sum of the N Recommended Wage Distributions








Unequal Weights Formula in A Formula in A
Notes:  The covariance term is positive (negative) in the positive(negative)-association cases.  Perfect negative association occurs only when
N equals 2.Table 8.  The Effects on Wage Inequality of Introducing One New Wage-Setter
    into a Group of N Independent-Minded and Equally-Weighted Wage-Setters,
    where the Recommended Wage Distributions Are Identical with Finite Variance










A.  Formulas for Var(Y)
B.  Change in Var(Y) from Time 1 to Time 2
No Change Inequality decreases Inequality increases
C.  Size of Proportional Increase/Decrease in Var(Y)
Notes:  The number of wage-setters at Time 1 is equal to N.  The recommended wage
distributions of all wage-setters have the same finite variance, Var(X).Table 9.  PDF, Variance, and Gini Coefficient in the Shifted Erlang Distribution Arising
    When the Wage-Setters Are Equally-Weighted and Their Recommended Wage
    Distributions Are Shifted Exponentials Identically and Independently




PDF Variance Gini Coefficient
A.  General Formulas
N











Notes:  The parameter a represents the minimum income.Table 10.  Mean, Median, and Mode in the Shifted Erlang Distribution Arising When the
      Wage-Setters Are Equally-Weighted and Their Recommended Wage
      Distributions Are Shifted Exponentials Identically and Independently





A.  General Formulas
N
B.  Special Case where a = .25
1 1.25 .943 .25
2 1.25 1.097 .75
3 1.25 1.148 .917
4 1.25 1.173 1
5 1.25 1.189 1.05
6 1.25 1.199 1.083
7 1.25 1.206 1.107
8 1.25 1.212 1.125
9 1.25 1.216 1.139
10 1.25 1.219 1.15
Notes:  The parameter a represents the minimum income.Table 11.  Associated Functions, Major Parameters, and Other Properties of the Shifted
      Exponential, the Shifted Erlang, and the Shifted Ring(2)-Exponential
      Distributions Which Arise in Wage Analysis:  Equally-Weighted Case
Feature/Property One
Wage-Setter

















Mean a + 1 a + 1 a + 1 a + 1
Variance 1 1 .5 .178
Median a + ln(2)  a + ln(2)
Mode aa a  + ln(2)
Skewness 2 2 2.63
Kurtosis 9 9 6 13.1
Gini coefficient
Notes:  The parameter a represents the minimum income.  When a equals zero, the shifted
distributions reduce to the standard exponential, the Erlang, and the original ring(2)-exponential
derived by Jasso (2001) in the study of status and analyzed by Jasso and Kotz (2007).Table 12.  Final Wage Distributions in Two-Party Society, with Recommended Wage
      Distributions Identical Shifted Exponentials, by Type of Micro Consensus and
      Whether the Two Parties Are Equal or Unequal in Size
Party Split
Micro Consensus:
















Notes:  In the equal party split, p = .5.  The variate in the equal-split/perfect-negative-association
case is the shifted version of the ring(2)-exponential derived by Jasso (2001) in the study of
status and analyzed by Jasso and Kotz (2007).Table 13.  Gini Coefficient in Two-Party Society, with Recommended Wage Distributions
       Identical Shifted Exponentials, by Type of Micro Consensus and Party Split
Party Split
Micro Consensus:
Association between Two Parties’ Wage Distributions

















Note.  The variates arising in the perfect positive, independent, and perfect negative cases are the
shifted exponential, shifted general Erlang, and shifted mirror-exponential, respectively.Figure 1.  Graphs of the Probability Density Function of the Wage
Distribution in a Society with Equally Powerful and Independent-
Minded Wage-Setters, for Number of Wage-Setters from 1 to 10. 
The variate is the shifted Erlang distribution which arises when the
wage-setters are equally weighted and their recommended
distributions are independently and identically distributed as
shifted exponentials.  The graphs are for shifted Erlangs arising
from shifted exponentials with a mean of 1.25 and a minimum of
.25.  Looking at the middle region of the plot (approximately 1.25
on the horizontal axis), the graphs line up from bottom to top
corresponding to number of wage-setters from 1 to 10.  As the
number of wage-setters increases, the distribution gets more
concentrated about its mean of 1.25 and also more symmetric. 
When the number of wage-setters is one, the shifted Erlang reduces
to the shifted exponential.Figure 2.  Graphs of the Probability Density Function of the Wage
Distribution in a Society with Two Unequally Powerful
Independent-Minded Wage-Setters.  From top to bottom at the
mode, the five variates correspond to party split p = .1, .2, .3, .4,
and .5.  The top four are shifted general Erlang variates, and the
bottom variate (with two equally powerful wage-setters) is the
shifted Erlang also depicted in Figure 1.  The graphs are for
variates arising from shifted exponential variates with a minimum
of .25 and a mean of 1.25.Figure 3.  Graphs of the Probability Density Function of the Wage
Distribution in a Society with Two Equally Powerful Wage-Setters. 
The three variates are the shifted exponential, shifted Erlang, and
shifted ring(2)-exponential which arise when the wage-setters are
like-minded, independent-minded, and opposite-minded,
respectively.  The graphs are for variates arising from shifted
exponential variates with a minimum of .25 and a mean of 1.25. 
At the mean, the graphs line up from bottom to top corresponding
to the shifted exponential, shifted Erlang, and shifted ring(2)-
exponential.  The shifted exponential is also depicted in Figure 1,
and the shifted Erlang in both Figures 1 and 2.Figure 4.  Gini Coefficient in Two-Party Society, by Party Split p. 
Graphs of the Gini coefficient in the shifted general Erlang (upper
graph) and the shifted mirror-exponential (lower graph) arise from
independent and negatively-associated wage distributions,
respectively.  In both situations, the Gini coefficient is at its
minimum when the two parties are equally-sized.  For every party
split, the Gini coefficient is lower when the two parties are
oppositely-minded than when they are independent-minded. 
Graphed values do not include the shift factor (see Table 13).